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This paper uses a static spatial banking model with a non-uniform wealth distribution to
provide theoretical assessments for differences in banks’ prices and locations across regions. It
assumes imperfect information, where banks know more about individuals if they are “near”
the bank and individuals incur in a cost proportional to this distance to show the viability of
their projects to the bank. A free entry model is constructed to account for banks’ tendency to
concentrate in rich regions and to charge lower prices. Comparative statics exercises show the
effect of changes in the monitoring technology and wealth dispersion.
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I. Introduction
The non-competitive behavior of the banking industry has been extensively
documented. The available evidence on the banking industry points to the fact
that, despite technological advances that reduced the cost of information flows,
regional aspects of the industry play an important role. For instance, Petersen and
Rajan (2002) show that the distance to the nearest bank is a good predictor of the
cost that small firms face for obtaining credit. Moreover, Hannan (1991) finds that
the commercial loan market in the United States is local instead of national. Keeton
(1998) shows that the cost of receiving a loan from a bank outside the rural area is
higher than receiving it from a local bank.
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Concentration and market size explain much of the inter-regional differences in
prices of banking services. For instance, Pilloff and Rhoades (2002) provide
empirical evidence on the effect of the market size and concentration measures on
banks’ profitability. They argue that larger market sizes are associated with lower
profit rates, because higher profits are a magnet for entry and thus are
unsustainable. They also show that income per capita (or wealth) is a possible
indicator of market’s attractiveness. In addition, wealthier customers may be able
to shop for better banks and may hold large balances or utilize more profitable
services. Berger and Hannan (1989) explain the relationship between concentration
and profitability in terms of the non-competitive price behavior of banks and find
a price-concentration relationship consistent with this hypothesis.
In developing countries, regional aspects of the banking market might be more
important provided that worse information technologies are used. For Argentina,
Burdisso and D’Amato (1999) show that the degree of concentration (as measured
by the market share) is very small in the most populated areas of the country, while
the opposite occurs in less developed areas. An immediate consequence is that
banks contribute to enlarge regional disparities.
These facts motivate the use of a spatial model where geographic distance
plays an important role. Several studies use spatial models to account for banking
competition. For instance, Wong and Chan (1993) develop a standard Hotelling
(1929) model and Chiappori, Perez-Castillo and Verdier (1995) use a Salop (1979)
style model. They argue that those models are adequate because of the existence
of “monitoring costs” that are proportional to the “distance” mentioned earlier.
The space in which those distances develop can be regional, socio-cultural, etc.
Dell’Ariccia (2001) interprets it as a general space of products where borrowers
have preferences for a particular type of loan and uses a spatial model to formalize
market power and strategic interaction.
This paper uses a static Hotelling-linear-city-style model with free entry and
proportional monitoring costs. In this model, banks have some local market power
over their clients, which is a consequence of the existence of those costs. The
contribution of the paper is to introduce an unequal distribution of wealth. This
will produce important results. First, regions with a high density of wealth will
have low prices and more banks. This adds a potential explanation to the
priceconcentration relationship in banking. Second, the average monitoring cost
will be higher for low wealth density regions. A limitation of the model is that only
one side of banks’ activity, the lending process, is studied.
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in the distribution of wealth (as measured by a dispersion parameter) is explored.
The former was extensively studied (see for instance Rajan 1992, Wilhem 1999,
Marquez 2002, and Hauswald and Marquez 2004). The spatial model provides a
simple framework to study the effect of the introduction of a new technology:
lower monitoring costs produce higher dispersion in the location of banks but
lower prices. The effect of changes in the concentration of wealth was studied
only in two-firm models (see for instance Neven 1986, Tabuchi and Thisse 1995
and Anderson, Goeree and Ramer 1997). The model developed in the paper allows
to study the overall distribution of many banks.
II. The model
Consider a modification of the Linear City model (Hotelling 1929). A country is
represented by the real line and has inhabitants (or individuals) distributed
uniformly (the measure of inhabitants is infinite). Let the continuous variable
xÎÂrepresent the location of those individuals. Each inhabitant has an associated
wealth represented by the measurable function x® f(x). If the distribution of wealth
is uniform, f(x) will be a constant (without loss of generality 1). If that is not the
case, assume that
Assumption 1 (Non-uniform distribution of wealth): : f Â®Âis a measurable
function which is twice continuously differentiable, and satisfies
(i)  f(x) has a unique maximum at x=0;
(ii) symmetry: f(x)=f(-x);
(iii)  f(.) ³ 1, f’(x) ³ 0 for x < 0, f’(x) £ 0 for x > 0, f’(0) = 0;
(iv) ò ( f (x) -1) dx = 1
(v)   || || lim ( ) 1, lim '( ) 0
xx fx f x
®¥ ®¥ ==
Moreover, as |x|® ¥ wealth becomes uniformly distributed. Additionally, x =
0 represents the richest inhabitant of the country, and wealth decreases as |x|
becomes larger. A simple way to generate this wealth measure is to assume a
uniform measure and to add a density function (e.g., a standard normal). Thus, as
|x| increases, the contribution of the density becomes negligible.
This standard set-up can be reinterpreted to accommodate a non-uniform
distribution of inhabitants with the same wealth. In this case, f(.) would become a
population measure and therefore, high values of f(.) would be associated with
highly populated regions of the country. In any case, a region is defined as an
interval on the real line. Therefore, a rich (poor) region is one with relative high
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The country’s inhabitants can consume their wealth or invest in projects that
provide v > 1 goods per good invested (since our model is static we do not have
a time discount factor). v is assumed to be large enough to assure competition in
the model presented below. Thus, individuals with a wealth of f(x) prefer to carry
out the projects and get v×f(x). However, the projects need banks’ services.
Additionally, those projects are not directly observable by banks, unless the
individuals pay a fee, which is proportional to the distance to the nearest bank.
Call this cost h. Following Wong and Chan (1993) this cost will be referred vaguely
as monitoring cost. Those authors assume that the bank pays the full cost of
monitoring, but the assumption that the borrowers pay the fee h is consistent with
the idea that they have to move to the bank’s location and show their projects’
viability. In a broader interpretation, banks may be better informed about the
profitability of local producers’ projects than about remote regions. Similarly
information about local tax exemptions or subsidies may be available only for local
projects.
Consider two infinite sequences of banks, indexed by i = 0,1,2,… and k =
0,1,2,…, that play a three stage non-cooperative game. In the first stage i = 0,1,2,…
simultaneously decide whether or not to enter the market (let {} 0 ii E
¥
=be the entry
decisions) , and if they do, they choose a location {} 0 i i z
¥
=  where zi denotes location
on the real line (two banks cannot locate at the same point).1 Banks k = 0,1,2,…
may enter the market immediately after the first stage is decided (second stage).
Denote by {} 0 kk E
¥
=  the entry decisions and by {} 0 k k y
¥
=the locations of the second-
stage banks.
In the third stage they compete in prices. Banks can charge two different prices
(one to the left and one to the right), denoted by {}
0 , ii i PP
¥ -+
= and {}
0 , kk k PP
¥ -+
= for
the first-stage and second-stage banks respectively. This price discrimination will
simplify the computation of the equilibrium without altering the qualitative
conclusions. Each bank can enter only through one branch and face an entry cost
given by 0 < s < ¥ and a constant cost per service 0 < c < ¥. The payoffs are given
by (6) below.
In the presence of linear costs, the demand and profit functions may be
discontinuous  and  a  Nash  equilibrium with pure strategies may not exist in the
1 The game proposed is a modification of the Economides’ (1989) model. This author used a
three stage game to compute symmetric equilibrium in a Circular City model, where the first
stage is entry, the second location and the third price competition. We simplify the exposition
by compacting his first two stages. The use of an additional pool of players does not appear in
Economides’ model and is an ad hoc addition to ensure the existence of equilibrium. See also
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third stage (see D’Asprenmont et al. 1979 and Tirole 1988, chapter 7, for a
discussion). One popular solution is to impose a quadratic cost structure. Instead,
the linear structure is maintained with the additional assumption that regions can
only buy services from their nearest banks. That is, given two banks’ locations, all
the regions located in between can only buy services at these two places. In
equilibrium, it is reasonable to assume that this is true. Moreover, it makes the price
discrimination structure consistent.
Sometimes a Salop (1979) Circular City style model is considered more appropriate
for modeling strategic interaction. The advantages of this model emerges when
considering the Linear City defined on a compact segment [0,1] where locationprice
equilibriums cannot be obtained with more than two players (see Gabszewicz and
Thisse 1986 and Tirole 1988, chapter 7, for a general discussion). However the
interaction properties of my model are similar to those in the Circular City, while an
easier treatment of the wealth measure can be done on the real line. The additional
pool of banks assumption (or a similar one) would also be required in the Circular
City model with an unequal distribution of wealth. The model’s goal is to study the
distribution of banks, and not the number of entries (which is infinite).
The use of a non-uniform wealth distribution is not new. For instance, Neven
(1985) used a two firm Linear City model to study a location-price game. He made
use of the same solution concept used here and gave conditions on the distribution
density function for obtaining different degrees of differentiation: a higher
concentration of wealth produces closer locations. A similar model was developed
by Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) for a triangular and symmetric distribution. In this
case, no symmetric equilibrium exists. Instead they show the existence of asymmetric
equilibriums, characterized by a strong product differentiation. Similar results are
obtained by Anderson, Goeree and Ramer (1997). In contrast to those papers, our
model allows to handle more than two players.
III. The equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is that of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). For
fixed locations (third stage) a Nash equilibrium can be easily found by computing
the prices strategies as in a standard Hotelling model. In the second stage, the
banks k=0,1,2,… take as given the first-stage locations. No new entrances will
occur if the locations in the first stage are sophisticated enough. The location
sequence may not be unique, provided that the entire real line is to be filled: Lemma
2  below  shows  two  SPNE  location  patterns  in the uniform case which generate JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 150
either zero or positive profits (for a discussion about the multiplicity of equilibriums
see Eaton 1976). A formal definition of the equilibrium concept is provided:
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* * , k k k P P  maximize the first-stage  and second-stage
bank’s profits given in (6) and are non-negative, for fixed locations; {}
¥
= 0
* * , k k k y E is
a Nash equilibrium for the k = 0,1,2,… banks (i.e., each k bank has no incentives to
deviate given the strategies of the other 0,1,…k-1,k+1… second-stage banks),
where the first stage locations are fixed and prices strategies are optimal in the
third stage; and finally {}
¥
= 0
* * , i i i z E is also a Nash equilibrium of the first stage
subgame (i.e., each i bank has no incentives to deviate given the strategies of the
other 0,1,…i-1,i+1… first-stage banks), taking into consideration potential
entrances in the second-stage and the terminal node price strategies.
A. Third stage: Price competition
Through this subsection we assume that no entries occur in the second-stage,
although the description applies to both sets of banks since locations are fixed.
Assume a bank in the zÎ Â position of the line-market. It will attract individuals
from the left (-) and from the right (+). Let’s call these individuals borrowers. The
scope of each bank is given by those individuals who prefer buying bank services
at the z location. Define:
Definition 2: {} , ii PP
-+ are the prices that the ith  bank, which is in ziÎÂ, charges to
its right and left respectively.  i P
-
+  is the (left) price of the nearest bank from the
right, which is in z+iÎÂ (z+i > zi).  i P
+
- and z-i (zi > z-i) are the (right) price and location
of the nearest bank from the left.
Definition 3:  i x
+is the distance between bank i (at zi) and the borrower who is
indifferent between buying services in zi and  i z+ . i x
-is the distance between bank
i and the individual who is indifferent between buying services in zi and  i z- .
The indifferent borrowers can be found using the following indifference
equations:
[] () ii i i Ph x Ph zzx
+-
++ +=+ --
[] () ii i i Ph x Ph zz x
-+
-- +=+ - -
(1)
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 The scope of each bank depends on its price and location, the prices and
locations of its rivals and the costs of entry, production and monitoring. Each bank
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i z Qf x d x
+ + + º ò subject to  ,,, 0 iii i PPxx
-+ - + ³ . If
we assume that the prices and places of all the banks are given, the ith  bank will act
as a local monopolist.
Assuming an interior solution and using the Leibniz rule, the first order condi-
tions can be expressed as:
1
() () 0  
2
ii i i QP c f z x
h
++ + --+ = ,
1
() () 0  
2
ii i i QP c f z x
h
-- - --- = .
The second order condition requires that 
2
1
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. The bank responds in the usual way to an
increment in the distance or price of the rival banks. The following Lemma shows
the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1: Consider Assumption 1. For fixed locations, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium in the third stage subgame.
Proof: The existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium has been extensively
analyzed for the uniform case (see Gabszewicz and Thisse 1986).  The price
differentiation setup and the assumption that borrowers can only buy services
from their nearest banks allows proving the existence and uniqueness of Nash
(5)
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(7)
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equilibriums by looking at pair-wise Nash equilibriums of two banks each controlling
only one price.
For the non-uniform case, it involves solving a system of two non-linear
equations with two unknowns. Without loss of generality assume that the banks
i=0 and i=1 are contiguous with locations z0 = 0 and z0 = 1 respectively. As stated
above, we assume that v is large enough to generate competition between the two
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Note that both functions are continuous in both arguments. Consider















+ = ò  and let  P be a large enough price (i.e., v). Define




, [ : , 1 0 1 0 0 P P P P c P P P X Î Î = - + - + + and  ( ) { } )
~
, [ ), ,
~
[ : , 1 0 1 0 0 P c P P P P P P X Î Î = - + - + - . Note
that for any  ( ) + - + Î 0 1 0 , X P P we have  0 (.) 0 > g while for ( ) - - + Î 0 1 0 , X P P ,  0 (.) 0 £ g . Also
similar arguments can be used to show the existence of the sets  +
1 X and  -
1 X which
produce positive and non-positive values of  (.) 1 g respectively. The existence of a
solution follows from Miranda’s Theorem on the existence of a zero of a nonlinear
mapping, which is a generalization of the one-dimensional intermediate value
theorem. Uniqueness is a consequence of the monotonicity of f(.).
B. First stage: Location
Define Z, the space of spatial locations, as the set of all possible collection of
locations of the form {} ¥
¥ - j z with  j z z z j j j " ¥ < < < < -¥ + -    1 1 . Let {} ¥
¥ - j denote a
spatial ordering generated by those locations. Since for fixed locations prices are
unique, any SPNE can be seen as an element of Z with an induced price sequence.
Define  () z z z , ; P as the profit obtained, as in (6), by a bank located at  () z z z , Î with
its closest competitors at () , zz. Also define  () (,) a r g s u p ;,
z
zz zzz D= P .
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1
(,) ( ) ( ) (,) 0
2 tP P
gPP fx d x P cft PP
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Definition 4: {}
¥
¥ - j z is a profitable entry-deterrence sequence if it is a spatial
location such that  ( ) 0 , ; 1 1 ³ P + - j j j z z z   j " and  ( ) 0 , ); , ( 1 1 £ D P + + j j j j z z z z   j " .
{}
¥
¥ - j z   is a maximum differentiation sequence if it is a spatial location such that
( ) 0 , ; 1 1 ³ P + - j j j z z z   j "  and  ( ) 0 , ); , ( 1 1 = D P + + j j j j z z z z   j " . 
{}
¥
¥ - j z   is a zero-profit sequence if it is a spatial location such that
( ) 0 , ; 1 1 = P + - j j j z z z   j "  and  ( ) 0 , ); , ( 1 1 £ D P + + j j j j z z z z j " .
A profitable entry-deterrence sequence does not have any entry in the
secondstage. Also note that maximum differentiation and zero-profit sequences
are special cases of the former.
Uniform distribution of wealth
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bank k are a non-decreasing function of the distance 
* *
1 j j z z d - = + . Moreover by
symmetry of the uniform case the entrant bank will satisfy d/2. Entry deterrence is
obtained by finding d which satisfies
1
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where the first equation corresponds to the first order condition, taking into
consideration the potential (symmetric) effect on their competitors and the second





no additional entrances would occur in the second stage for a first-stage bank
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generates a profit sequence {}
¥
¥ - = P s j
* . A zero-profit SPNE is obtained by setting
, 11)






+ -= " . Note that banks have no incentives to change location,






j j j j z z z z - = - + -   is optimal in the uniform case.
Non-uniform distribution of wealth
Unlike the uniform case, in a non-uniform wealth distribution banks may prefer to
move towards higher density regions, for fixed locations of their competitors. In
turn this leapfrogs those banks that may initially choose to settle in a high density
zone, destroying the equilibrium. This may be avoided by the proposed sequential
location structure, where additional banks enter the market after the first round of
locations is done. If, for fixed competitor’s locations, a bank decides to change its






j z   is a location compatible sequence if it is a spatial location
such that   ()
** * *
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Condition (13) implies that when considering the remaining (first-stage) banks’
location as fixed, no deviation, which attracts a new entrance, would produce a
profit higher than the one obtained at equilibrium. This condition is satisfied in the
uniform distribution equilibriums described in Lemma 2.





³  Then, any location compatible sequence is SPNE.
Proof: It is only needed to show that in the first stage, for fixed locations of the




1 + - < < j j j z z z , with profit level 
*
j P  (defined in Definition 5), and located in the




1 0 + - < < < < j j j j z z z z , where the bank j prefers to move to a higher density
zone). This motivates the entrance of at least one more bank in the second stage
(for more than one bank a similar argument applies). If only one bank enters in the




1 + - < < < j k j j z y z z .
If 
*
j k z y £ , clearly the new location of bank j would generate negative profits (by
the entry-deterrence condition), then 
*
j k z y >  . Moreover by assumption,
( ) 0 , ; sup £ P k j
y
y z y  (only one additional bank). Then, if  z j becomes closer to 
*
1 - j z .
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profits became non-positive (since  k y  goes to 
*
j z , which implies that profits increase
in the opposite direction. As  j z  approaches 
*
j z  , profits are below the original
level (since there is an additional bank k). The location compatible property (13)




1 ) , ( , ; sup j j j j j
z
z z z z
j
P £ D P + -  , therefore the profit level cannot be
above the original one, which contradicts that the new location was better.
Note that a zero-profit equilibrium cannot be achieved in this context. If a bank
deviates from its original location (i.e. moving towards the high density regions),
it can do so without attracting new entrances. Moreover maximum differentiation
is not enough to ensure the existence of SPNE.
Also note that as |x| ® ¥ and f(x) ® 1 the location sequence becomes that
described in Lemma 2. We will use the term “convergence” to denote the fact that
a location sequence becomes that of the uniform case as |x| ®¥. Note that if the
location sequence converges, prices and profits will also converge to the uniform
case. We will say that a sequence converges faster than other sequence, if smaller
value of |x| is required to observe convergence to the uniform case.
C. Simulation and empirical implications
Unfortunately, in general the model does not provide explicit analytical solutions
for a non-uniform distribution of wealth. The reason is that solving the first order
conditions requires solving a system of two non-linear equations with two
unknowns, since this involves using both the density and the distribution functions
(see Lemma 1 for a discussion and existence of solution).
To study the distribution pattern of banks across regions we use the following
non-uniform distribution of wealth:












= , that is a normal density function with mean zero
and standard deviation s.2 It can be easily checked that f(x) satisfies Assumption
1, that is, it is symmetric about zero and converges to 1 as x goes to infinity.
In this subsection it is showed that in equilibrium banks are more concentrated
in richer regions and more disperse in poorer ones. Therefore, richer regions will
face lower prices. Moreover, the average monitoring cost in a poor region will be
higher than the one in a rich region, provided that for the same interval length,
2 Similar results were obtained for other unimodal distributions.
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more banks will be located in the latter than in the former. Comparative statics
results where we consider changes in the monitoring costs (h) and the concentration
of wealth ( s) are provided in the following subsections.
To show how the model works, consider a simulation with parameters c = 1,
s = 1.25, h = 10, s  = 1.3 In equilibrium, as x goes to infinity and the wealth






== ; profits will be  1.25 U s P==   and prices  2/ 6 U Ps d c =+ =   (see
Lemma 2). In other words, the distance between contiguous banks, prices and
profit sequences will converge to the uniform case. The following paragraphs
describe the simulation exercise.
Since the distribution of wealth is unimodal, assume that a bank is located at
the mode. This requirement is not necessary (the equilibrium is not unique) but it
simplifies the computation. Let this bank be i = 0 (then z0 = 0). Moreover, let the
banks located in the positive locations be odd, and in the negative be even.
Therefore z1 Î (0,¥), z2 Î (-¥,0), zi > z1 for i odd and z2 > zi for i even. Consider first
the location of the i = 1 bank. Entry deterrence is achieved by any location
*







£ P > = 0 , 0 ; sup : 0 sup
*
1 z x z z
x z
. To achieve a location
compatible sequence we set  
*
11 zz = . We use a simulation exercise to compute 
*
1 z
based on the following algorithm:
· Construct a grid spacing of 0.005, i.e.  1 {0, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, } W= ¼
·  For each  1 W Î z , construct  () { } z x x z x
x
, 0 ; max : ) ( 1 P W Î =
· Define  () { } 0 , 0 ); ( : max 1
*
1 £ P W Î = z z x z z
z














3 z z x z z z
x z   and to higher odd-numbered banks. In that case
we use the following algorithm, for i = 3,5,7…:








2 i ´ + ´ + + = W - - - - i i i i z z z z
· For each  i z W Î , construct  ( ) { } z z x x z x i
x
i , ; max : ) (
*
2 - P W Î =
· Define  () {}
**
2 max : ( ); , 0 ii i z zz x z z z - =Î W P £
By symmetry, set  *
1
*
+ - = i i z z  for i = 1,3,5… Condition (13) and the second order
conditions of the third stage (see footnote 2) need to be checked on a case by case
basis.
3 A high value of h is used to have a significant location sequence in the non-uniform part of
the wealth measure. Similar results may be achieved by expanding the density mass (i.e.
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Figure 1A shows the computed location and distance between contiguous
banks, that is, the graph  () {}
** *
2 ,: 0 , 1 , 3 , 5 . . . . ii i zz z i +-= . It can be noted that banks
become more disperse as the distribution of wealth becomes more uniform.
Therefore, high wealth density regions (e.g., an interval around x = 0) will face
lower average monitoring costs as more banks are located there than in any other
interval of the same length in a uniformly distributed region. Figure 1B plots the
price sequences  () () {}
** ** , , , :i=0,1,3,5...  ii ii zP zP
-+   . Prices increase monotonically
as x increases. Hence, high wealth-density regions will also face lower prices. The
intuition behind the model can be summarized as follows: in regions with high
wealth, (first stage) banks are compelled to come closer together to avoid future
entrances (in the second stage), but this results in more competition, and
consequently lower prices. Also, note that there exist small differences between
P-* and P+*: for i = 0 both prices are equal, and we have that 
** ,i=0,1,3,5...  ii PP
-+ £ .
The reason is that for x > 0 (i.e., i odd), P- represents the price charged towards the
higher density region, and by lowering the price, the bank will be able to attract
more wealthy borrowers. At the same time, each bank faces more competition
towards the higher density direction. Finally Figure 1C reports the profit sequence
() {}
** , : 0,1,3,5.... ii zi P=   . In this case, no clear pattern emerges: if on the one
hand, more competition translates into lower prices (and lower profits), on the
other hand more density of wealth produces larger profits.
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Figure 1C. Location and profits
P +
P -
This model is in line with the Berger and Hannan (1989) price-concentration
relationship. Those authors found that prices are less favorable to consumers in
more concentrated markets (regions with more dispersed banks in our case) because
of the non-competitive behavior. Moreover, the fact that regions with lower average159 NON-UNIFORM WEALTH DISTRIBUTION IN A SIMPLE SPATIAL BANKING MODEL
monitoring costs (i.e., a measure of the average distance to the nearest bank) face
lower prices corresponds to the Petersen and Rajan (2002) findings. Furthermore,
except for the bank located at x = 0, the average profits are lower in regions
with high wealth density (i.e. P < 1.25) than in regions with low wealth density
(PU = 1. 25). This is consistent with Pilloff and Rhoades’s (2002) profitconcentration
relation and with Burdisso and D’Amato’s (1999) results for Argentina.
The results of the model contribute to the understanding of regional disparities
in the banking industry. In this case, a rich region should be associated with high
values of f(.), while a poor region with low values of f(.). In the former, the
concentration of wealth (i.e. more wealthy clients or more clients) attracts more
banks, which produces lower average monitoring costs and lower prices than in
the latter.
D. Information technologies
The model provides a simple framework to study the effect of the introduction of
a new technology (a reduction in h, the monitoring cost). As Lemma 2 shows, in




. Moreover prices would be proportional to h, that is
() () Ph c h dh c A s h =+ =+ ,where A is a constant which depends on the SPNE
used but not on h. Consequently, a reduction in h would produce higher dispersion
among banks but lower prices. A priori, we expect a similar effect to appear in the
non-uniform case. For the non-uniform case, we provide simulations to study the
effect of a change in h. We construct simulations as in Section III.C where h takes
values in {6,8,10}. Figures 2A through 2C report the graphs
() {}
** *
2 ( ), ( ) ( ) : 0,1,3,5...., 6,8,10   ii i zhz h zh i h + -= = (15)
() () {}
** ** ( ), ( ) , ( ), ( ) :i=0,1,3,5...,h=6,8,10  ii ii zhP h zhP h
-+ (16)
() {}
** () , (): 0 , 1 , 3 , 5 . . . . , 6 , 8 , 1 0 ii zh h i h P= = (17)
The simulations show similar results to those obtained in the uniform case,
that is, as h decreases (i.e. better monitoring technology), the distance between
banks increases, prices decrease and there is no clear effect on profits. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 160
Figure 2A. Location and distance: Different information technologies
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Figure 2C. Location and profits: Different information technologies
E. Concentration of wealth
As a final exercise we study the effect of different concentration of wealth, as
measured by different values of the dispersion parameter. Again, we construct
simulations as in Section III.C where s takes values in {1,2,3}. Figures 3A through
3C report the graphs
() {}
** *
2 ( ), ( ) ( ) : 0,1,3,5...., 1,2,3   ii i zz z i sss s + -= =
  () () {}
** ** ( ), ( ) , ( ), ( ) :i=0,1,3,5..., =1,2,3   ii ii zP zP ss ss s
-+
() {}
** ( ), ( ) : 0,1,3,5...., 1,2,3   ii zi ss s P= =
We observe that the smaller the value of dispersion, the faster the convergence
to the uniform case distance among contiguous banks (= 0.5) and prices (= 6).
Regions near x = 0 would face lower average distance and prices for a smaller
value of s. However borrowers located before the convergence to the uniform
case but not close enough to x = 0, will prefer higher values of s. The same pattern
is observed for profits, that is, faster convergence for smaller values of s. In this
case, for s = 3, the range considered is not enough to observe convergence.
, (18)
, (18)
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Figure 3A. Location and distance: Different concentration of wealth
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Figure 3C. Location and profits: Different concentration of wealth
IV. Conclusions
The paper explored the importance of a non-uniform wealth distribution in a spatial
banking model. Without loss of generality we consider a unimodal distribution of
wealth. In a free entry model, the banks will be unequally distributed across regions
if wealth also is. Richer regions will have more banks, lower prices and a lower
mean monitoring cost than poorer regions. In turn, this exacerbates regional
disparities, provided that access to financial services contributes to the regional
growth potential.
Additionally it studies the effect of the introduction of better technologies in
the spatial location of banks. As in the uniform case, lower monitoring costs
produces more differentiation, but lower prices. We also study changes in the
concentration of wealth across regions. In this case, regions close enough to the
mode of the wealth distribution would face the lowest average distance and prices
for small values of the dispersion parameter. However, this does not apply if we
consider regions distant from the mode.
The model can also be applied to other industries that share the same logic,
where the customers are responsible for paying a cost proportional to the
“distance” to the firm and the firm has some local monopoly power over its closest JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 164
clients. The model predicts that the distribution of wealth influences the location
pattern of firms, their prices and profits, and the average monitoring/transportation
cost customers in different regions may face.
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